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This text analyses lay knowledge and rationales in which self-medication practices are involved. 
After a brief critical review of the main theoretical landmarks in the analysis of lay knowledge 
compared with expert knowledge, the objective is to demonstrate the current forms of lay 
appropriation and reconversion of expert knowledge and the modes of expertisation that this 
shared knowledge reveals. The text discusses, on the one hand, the new forms of lay dependence 
on expert knowledge and, on the other, the sociological potential which these forms entail in 
terms of the development of new areas of lay autonomy, by focusing on the topic of self-
medication and a typology of modes of lay cognitive construction, namely spontaneous 
knowledge, mediated knowledge and confirmed knowledge. The constructed nature of this 
knowledge, which is not simply mimetically reproduced from expert sources, reveals the need for 
a new epistemological dialogue between the different theoretical trends that explore the 
reflexivity of modern societies.  
Keywords: Self-medication; types of lay knowledge; lay expertisation; modern reflexivity. 
 
Introduction 
In the current phase of modernity, new forms of lay protagonism are emerging within the 
field of healthcare which, in turn, indicate that a new sociological matrix is being designed 
with regard to lay forms of knowledge and rationales for therapy management.  
This introductory statement is based on the view that the traditional dichotomy between 
lay and expert rationales – on the basis of which interpretations of each of these spheres 
have been constituted – needs to be questioned in the light of the new analytical tools 
resulting from sociological theories of modernity and modern reflexivity.  
Within the field of healthcare, as in other social fields, lay reference systems are 
becoming increasingly evident as open systems, permeable to the assimilation of logics and 
concepts produced within expert spheres. One might even say that this permeability to 
expert logics has become one of the principal modern means of legitimating and socially 
validating expert systems of action. In the field of therapy, this is immediately evident in the 
rising demand for, and consumption of, medical solutions for an increasingly wide range of 
aspects of human life traditionally managed outside the sphere of medical intervention.  
Indeed, whether in the field of healthcare or in any other social field, this expansion of 
expertise within everyday life cannot be explained merely as an effect of the development of 
                                                 
*
 Article published in RCCS 78 (October 2007). 
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science and technology, or simply as the consequence of any technical and ideological 
hegemony. In addition to the social weight of these factors, it is also the product of the 
actual mediation of the lay population in the social dissemination of expert logics, evident in 
a general cultural adherence to the consumption of solutions made available through expert 
systems. 
Although such cultural adherence is an indisputable fact of modernity, this does not mean 
that we are witnessing the withering away or simple satellitisation of the specific rationality 
systems of lay universes. That is to say, it does not mean that these universes are being 
configured as mere passive recipients, or simple hostages to the forms of rationality and 
cognitive authority produced by expert bodies. On the contrary, the new forms of lay 
dependence on expertise contain conditions which favour new modes of autonomy and lay 
protagonism. It should be emphasized that both autonomy and protagonism have always 
been intrinsic to the logic underlying the formation of lay knowledge and rationales. What 
appears to be different nowadays are the references that are mobilised to construct these 
forms of knowledge and rationales.  
One type of lay practice within healthcare whose analysis is particularly appropriate to 
the set of premises presented here is the case of self-medication. This is the domain par 
excellence in which to capture the diversity of referential sources that shape lay knowledge 
and rationales and to understand the contingency and contextual plurality of the specific 
configurations which these forms of knowledge and rationales entail.  
This analytical exercise is based on research carried out into self-medication practices. 
The empirical universe included a total of 309 individuals living in the Lisbon metropolitan 
area, equally distributed by sex, aged between 18 and 64, and separated into 3 subgroups, 
one containing participants who did not suffer from any chronic illnesses and two others 
consisting of participants with diabetes and hypertension, respectively.1 Information was 
initially collected by means of a survey which involved administering a questionnaire to all 
                                                 
1
 The aim of including individuals with different health trajectories (with and without chronic illnesses) was to 
ensure a diverse sample with regard to their differing frequency of contact with the medical system and, 
specifically, with medicines. The participants with chronic illnesses were contacted through two health 
establishments which specialise in both types of illnesses, and the other participants were contacted in their 
workplace, an industrial company. 
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individuals, followed by a second phase of in-depth interviews administered to 50 of the 
individuals previously interviewed.2 
However, prior to this analytical incursion and in order to clarify the theoretical 
framework of its problematic, we begin with a brief critical reflection on the models of 
analysis that have influenced sociological theory on lay knowledge in healthcare.  
 
Theoretical landmarks in the analysis of lay knowledge in healthcare: A critical review  
The starting point for sociological production on lay knowledge in healthcare dates back to 
the early 1970s and is represented by the first studies published by Freidson (1970, 1984), 
which have become standard reference works for the sociology of healthcare. Freidson was 
the first author to confer theoretical visibility on the autonomy of the lay healthcare 
universe within the framework of modern societies. One of his conceptual findings in this 
area was based on the formulation of the notion of the lay referral system, establishing it as 
a new analytical category. The analytical and operational purpose behind this was to 
demonstrate that the reference matrix for lay concepts and perceptions of healthcare 
consisted of shared representations and experiences within the socio-cultural context of 
everyday experiences, rather than experiences resulting from contact with professionals. 
The primary importance of this new conceptual tool was that it led to a break with the 
Parsonian concepts that had predominated until them – i.e. formulations inspired by 
PaƌsoŶs͛s model (1966) of the passive role of the patient – which circumscribed the 
reference structure of the lay universes within their relationship to professionals and their 
subordination to technical and social authority. In other words, there was no true 
recognition of the logic intrinsic to lay universes, which were considered merely passive 
receptacles for expert decisions. Any deviation from this passive receptivity fell into the 
category of socially deviant and irrational behaviour.  
It was precisely as a result of this new theoretical concept introduced by Freidson and the 
recognition of the specific identity of lay universes that a series of other work on lay 
representations and practices in healthcare began to develop. Their merit was, unarguably, 
the contribution they made towards establishing a new understanding of the lay spheres of 
                                                 
2
 For more detailed information on the methodology for the research in question, see Lopes (2001, 2003). The 
research was carried out through CIES/ISCTE and was funded by INFARMED (National Institute for Medicines 
and Health Products) and the FCT (Foundation for Science and Technology) – (POCTI/SOC/36479/99). 
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healthcare and their endogenous rationales. However, some results of this new approach 
also helped foster – even contrary to their actual analytical intentions – a certain aura of 
exoticism for lay universes. Indeed, the intention to establish a firm dividing line between lay 
and expert universes and to describe the separate nature of the forms of cognition which 
organise each of them, ended up by circumscribing forms of lay knowledge within the 
category of beliefs or knowledge rooted in tradition, without recognising their status as 
knowledge. This is actually a conceptual view that still has its supporters today, not only in 
sociology but also in other branches of the social sciences, in which lay knowledge of 
healthcare continues to figure as a kind of exotic cultural item sometimes presented as 
something that should be preserved and at other times as the expression of idiosyncrasies 
and irrationalities that impede longed-for advances in healthcare.  
On a somewhat different note, another thread of analysis has developed parallel to this 
which, unlike the previous perspective, is directed primarily towards a relational reading of 
expert and lay universes (Navarro, 1976; Hart, 1985). This has involved bringing to light the 
power relations which structure interactions between the lay and expert universes. This 
therefore made it possible to recognise the subordinate relationship – as well as the 
mechanisms supporting it – within which the forms of lay protagonism are inscribed in the 
overall framework of professional dominance. Although this focus has the merit of making 
the issue of power visible – making it an analytical category indispensable to deciphering the 
hierarchical forms of coexistence between separate rationales and forms of knowledge – it 
has, on the other hand, taken away the visibility of the forms of lay autonomy that exist even 
within the hegemony of an expert rationale.  
These conceptual formulations began to be questioned at the end of the 1980s with the 
emergence of theoretical approaches to modernity and their contribution towards a new 
interpretation of the relationships between lay and expert universes. Within the framework 
of these new contributions, three theoretical-analytical categories should be highlighted, 
given that they have proved decisive to the new lines of inquiry which, from this time 
onwards, began to develop in connection with lay rationales and knowledge.  
One of these categories concerns the conceptual structure that encapsulates the notion 
of the dissemination of expert systems within everyday life (Giddens, 1992; Beck, 1992). This 
gave visibility to the intensifying relationships between the lay population and experts, 
enabling new forms of social proximity between both universes to be understood.  
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Another of the categories refers to the concept of reflexivity (Giddens, 1992). This 
concerns a concept which substantiates and confers visibility on the increasing centrality 
which the diffusion of expert information assumes in the constitution of social practices.  
The third category refers to the questioning of the notion of science itself as homogenous 
knowledge (Santos, 1989, 2000; Giddens, 1992; Nunes, 2001). This leads to the emergence 
of new frameworks of uncertainty, as well as to the ambivalent relationship between trust 
and scepticism which characterises the relations of lay people with expert information.  
It was through this new conceptual configuration that lay forms of knowledge and 
rationales on healthcare began to be considered. However, two theoretical trends which 
pursue different perspectives can be distinguished.  
One trend focuses on the dependence of lay knowledge on expert knowledge – due to 
the dissemination of expert systems in everyday life – and accounts for the gradual draining 
away of the autonomy of lay knowledge as a result of the increasing colonisation of everyday 
lay experience by the hegemony of expert knowledge (Peterson, 1997; Santos, 2000).3  
The other trend indicates the increasing autonomisation of lay universes. The search for 
alternative solutions to expert solutions, specifically within the field of healthcare, is 
presented as empirical evidence of the new forms of autonomy. Scepticism of science and 
increasing lay reflexiveness provide the basis for this new social framework (Williams and 
Popay, 1994; Sharma, 1996; Williams and Calnan, 1996).  
Either of these interpretations – the gradual expert colonisation of lay universes or the 
new forms of autonomisation of the latter – still remains a necessary exercise in order to 
account for an increasingly complex reality in which dependence and autonomy no longer 
constitute opposite poles but (paradoxically) reveal themselves to be increasingly 
interdependent realities. However, each of these perspectives is limited by their analytical 
closure. Both focus on only one aspect of the social dynamic that currently permeates the 
relationships between expert systems and lay universes.  
The need therefore arises for a different kind of dialogue between these theoretical 
approaches. My aim is to put this into practice by presenting an analytical exercise on self-
                                                 
3 The eŵphasis oŶ the effeĐt of ͞ĐoloŶisatioŶ͟ does Ŷot eǆĐlude otheƌ ĐoŶtƌiďutions within this theoretical 
trend relating to the emergence of new signs of the emancipation of lay knowledge. However, in revealing the 
hegemonic relationship that expert systems establish with lay universes, this emphasis represents the 
analytical advantage of this trend in terms of the current debate on rupture and continuity between the two 
paradigms of knowledge.  
RCCS Annual Review, 1, September 2009                                                          Changing Self-Medication Practices, Lay Knowledge and Rationales 
 
41 
medication and the modes of constructing the forms of knowledge and rationales on which 
lay practices are based.  
 
Self-medication practices and their sociological reframing 
The recurrence of contacts between the lay populace and expert systems and agents – 
which characterises the current phase of modernity4 – and the way in which the latter 
increasingly mould everyday experiences point, in fact, to a process whereby experts 
increasingly colonise lay universes. The way in which self-medication5 practices are 
configured nowadays is, in itself, illustrative of this colonisation or, to put it in different 
terms, the increasing lay dependence on expertise.  
In effect, recourse to self-medication began to increase as the phenomenon of 
medicalisation was disseminated throughout society, i.e. to the extent that the social fabric 
became impregnated with medical concepts of health and illness as a consequence of 
people͛s iŶĐƌeased ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith eǆpeƌt healthĐaƌe ageŶts.6 In this way, lay familiarity with 
medicines increased, due primarily to the fact that they were the main means of managing 
the treatment prescribed by medical decisions. Therefore, as the consumption of medical 
care increased, there was a parallel increase in the prescription and consumption of these 
therapeutic resources. Medicines gradually ceased to figure in the cultural mind as a ͞rare 
and esoteric commodity,͟ and became a ͞common and exoteric commodity͟ (Van der Geest 
and White, 1989). The phenomenon of medicalisation thereby gave rise to another related 
phenomenon, that of the pharmacologisation of everyday life,7 which involves the increased 
recourse to self-medication witnessed in recent decades.8  
                                                 
4
 Depending on the theoretical current in question, this phase of modernity has been called post-modernity, 
late modernity or reflexive modernity  
5
 The notion of self-medication is used in this text in its generally accepted meaning, i.e. the use of medicines 
without prior medical guidance. On the problematic of the ideological content that this notion encapsulates, 
specifically with regard to the normative and ethical-professional codes that underlie it, see Lopes, 2003: 26-40. 
6
 For a more detailed explanation of the concept of medicalisation and the phenomenon it refers to, see 
Crawford, 1980; Williams and Calnan, 1996. 
7
 For a more detailed explanation of the concept of pharmacologisation and the phenomenon it refers to, see 
Lopes, 2003: 47-54. 
8
 In European societies, the growing use of self-medication began to reveal itself from the 1970s onwards 
(WHO, 1988; Richard and Senon, 1996). In the specific case of Portugal, despite the incipient and disjointed 
nature of official data on this subject, it can be affirmed that this increase became more significant from the 
1980s onwards, with the creation of the category of over-the-counter-remedies and the fact that almost all of 
these ceased to be subsidised by the state. On the specific case of Portugal, see Lopes, 2003: 7-20.  
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In addition, most of the available records indicate that the great majority of self-
medication practices apply to health problems traditionally managed by recourse to 
domestic knowledge, which includes the so-called home remedies (Quaeyhaegens, 1996). 
This was equally evident in the research data which provides the empirical support for this 
article, given that approximately 80% of the health problems that had led to the use of self-
medication were related to general complaints such as headaches, flu, digestive problems, 
etc. (Lopes, 2001). It therefore focussed on symptoms that were rarely managed 
traditionally by recourse to pharmaceutical drugs. Moreover, in interviews with members of 
the older generation during the research, there was frequent mention of the fact that 
ŶoǁadaǇs theǇ took ŵediĐiŶe to tƌeat ͞ailŵeŶts͟ (sic) that could easily be treated in another 
way and which, when they were children or youngsters, were treated without medicine, 
whereas now this form of treatment had become a more practical solution.  
What this new framework shows is that current self-medication practices reflect the 
gradual expropriation of traditional cognitive resources and lay autonomy in the everyday 
management of treatment. In fact, medicines are therapeutic items over whose (complex) 
production processes the lay universe has no cognitive control – their virtual control over 
use is dissociated from any control over production – unlike the therapeutic resources 
produced within the home, in which control over use and production remained inseparable. 
In this sense, self-medication is clearly a practice that expresses a growing lay dependence 
on expert systems.  
However, this aspect of dependence assumes other forms if we note that the majority of 
self-medication practices involve medicines that have previously been prescribed by a 
doctor. In other words, the initial introduction to the medicine is generally through a doctor 
– or another expert agent – and it is only later that they are used on the initiative of the lay 
populace. In the research study in question, 63.8% of the medicines used (on the last 
occasion the interviewees used self-medication) had been prescribed by a doctor or 
recommended by a chemist on another occasion, and only the remaining 36.2% were used 
without any previous expert intervention (Lopes, 2001). Given that over a third of the latter 
ĐategoƌǇ had ďeeŶ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded ͞ďǇ soŵeoŶe kŶoǁŶ,͟ aŶd that therefore previous expert 
intervention had also been involved in accessing these therapeutic resources, the 
percentage of forms of self-medication involving recourse to medicines obtained through 
the intervention of experts is even more accentuated. It is therefore a matter of practices 
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which typify a gradual lay appropriation of expert logic for the management of treatment, 
and it is this appropriation that paves the way for new forms of lay autonomy in everyday 
healthcare.  
However, from an initial reading it might be said that these appropriations are nothing 
but an exact imitation of expert opinions, which would thus eliminate from the outset any 
analytical possibility of referring to a new lay protagonism, or even a new matrix for lay 
knowledge. But the lay appropriations of expert logic which are found in self-medication 
practices are not the only support for such lay initiatives in the management of treatment. 
There is always practical lay control (Baszanger, 1998) over the validity of these approaches, 
and even over the validity of expert decisions. This control is manifest in the central position 
assumed by bodily responses in lay criteria for validating treatment strategies.  
In fact, bodily responses constitute the main means of practical control over the 
effectiveness of the medicines used. Medicine used for self-medication is, in general, 
something that has already proved to produce the desired results, whether though the 
direct experience of the user or through experiences shared by other users. It is this same 
criterion of bodily response that legitimates lay decisions to continue or suspend treatments, 
even when taken under direct medical prescription. The following excerpts from interviews 
illustrate the central importance conferred on bodily responses:  
 
 ... when I get a cold or a fever I always take Nimed... [Q: Why?]. Why? First because it always 
ǁoƌks, I͛ǀe used it foƌ Ǉeaƌs aŶd it alǁaǇs has good ƌesults, aŶd also ďeĐause I doŶ͛t feel like it͛s 
doing me any harm in any other way, I doŶ͛t get any side effects ... (woman, aged 22, college 
student [3rd year], diabetic, interview 11)  
 
... I suffeƌ fƌoŵ osteopoƌosis aŶd it alǁaǇs huƌts ŵe heƌe ... aŶd it͛s haƌd foƌ ŵe to use ŵǇ left 
arm. I started taking some pills the doctor prescribed foƌ ŵe, I doŶ͛t ƌeŵeŵďeƌ the Ŷaŵe 
because it was more than a year ago and I only took them for a short time. They made my 
stomach bad, gave me heartburn and gave me a pain here ... So I stopped taking them and 
never went back to the doctor. I started using an ointment again, Reumon-gel, ǁhiĐh I͛d used 
before, and it always makes me feel ďetteƌ. But oŶe daǇ I͛ll haǀe to go ďaĐk to the doĐtoƌ 
ďeĐause I kŶoǁ that it oŶlǇ takes aǁaǇ the paiŶ, it doesŶ͛t Đuƌe it... ;ŵaŶ, aged ϱϳ, < ϵ Ǉeaƌs of 
schooling, with hypertension, interview 22)  
 
This means, therefore, that the body has a dual status within the framework of lay 
rationales on healthcare: it is not only the recipient of therapeutic interventions, but is also 
transformed into an instrument which monitors the efficiency of these interventions, 
whether lay or expert. Thus, it is through this central focus on bodily responses that direct 
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lay control is exerted over the options assimilated through contact with expert agents. 
Practical experience thus constitutes a cognitive category that invalidates all interpretations 
that confine lay decisions to the mere imitation of expert logic.  
It is through this ongoing conjunction of practical experience and information assimilated 
through contact with sources of expert information that lay trajectories for the management 
of treatment are constructed.  
 
Knowledges in process and lay expertisation 
Both direct bodily experience and the frameworks of social interaction through which this 
experience is validated play a central role in the production of lay reference systems for 
medicines. Thus, they are the two aspects that organise the overall matrix on which 
cognitive lay trajectories are based. It is within this matrix that the primacy of experience is 
constantly updated, within which the inherent practical nature of this sphere of knowledge 
is, in turn, inscribed (Williams and Popay, 1994).  
On the basis of this matrix, the concrete modes of cognitive lay acquisition assume 
different configurations and follow multiple itineraries. The various processes of learning 
involved reveal the constructed nature of this knowledge (Baszanger, 1989, 1998) as well as 
the impossibility of reducing it to a mimetic assimilation of bodily responses or references 
circulating within the frameworks of interaction.  
The learning component underlying any of the modes of generating knowledge about 
medicines is not an immediate and directly visible fact. Nevertheless, it can be captured 
analytically by using certain operational categories, such as those formulated by Nitcher and 
Vuckovic (1994) in their triptych of direct empirical learning, learning by example and 
learning through information. The use of these categories makes it possible to restore 
visibility not only to the constructed nature of the lay knowledge activated through the use 
of medicines, but also to the different types of knowledge consolidated by these forms of 
learning. 
Direct empirical learning is involved in situations in which the use of medicines occurs in 
circumstances where there is uncertainty regarding the complexity of the health problem 
concerned. In these situations, medicines are used both as an attempt at treatment and a 
means of diagnosis in order to assess the perceived symptoms, and also to determine, in the 
light of the resulting bodily responses, whether there is a need to seek professional care. 
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Here, control over the uncertain trajectory is ensured by the certainty that the 
appropriateness or otherwise of the solution adopted can be detected by reading the 
physical warnings.  
Outside the direct sphere of self-medication, Conrad (1985) also refers to other lay 
diagnostic strategies involving the same logic of direct empirical learning. This occurs when 
patients decide to suspend or reduce prescribed medicines as a means of assessing the 
origins of side effects, which are assumed to be related to the medicines being taken, or as a 
means of assessing their therapeutic effectiveness in terms of the symptoms developing 
when treatment is interrupted or reduced (1985: 32). These strategies configure what this 
author terms the rational empirical method that is intrinsic to laymanship.  
The results obtained from these different types of practices generate a legacy of 
provisional knowledge which is assumed as knowledge subject to review in the light of each 
new experience. However, as practices become routine over time, they become firm 
knowledge, which is naturalised and activated as spontaneous knowledge.  
There are many examples in which the nature of these trajectories as processes can be 
detected, as this second interview extract illustrates:  
 
The last tiŵe I ǁeŶt to the doĐtoƌ͛s ŵust haǀe ďeeŶ oǀeƌ a Ǉeaƌ ago, and it was because of a 
serious throat infection. I started to feel pain and it hurt when I swallowed, and I was getting 
those white spots with pus. I started taking a syrup and some pills I had at home – I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
what they were called, but they were a kind of anti-inflammatory pill and they usually worked 
well. But this time the infection was more complicated and it ǁasŶ͛t gettiŶg aŶǇ ďetteƌ, so I 
had to go to the doctor and I even had to take penicillin... (woman, aged 19, 9 years of 
schooling, healthy, interview 49)  
 
As this story illustrates, when the solution adopted does not work as a treatment 
strategy, the (subjectively mediated) effect is to confirm that the complexity of the problem 
exceeds lay competence and requires specialist intervention. However, in these 
circumstances, it is, once again, the medicine and the representations to which it is 
subjected that serve to confirm the complexity of the problem, which, in this case, was 
eŵphatiĐallǇ eǆpƌessed ďǇ highlightiŶg the Ŷeed to ͞take peŶiĐilliŶ.͟ It is not, therefore, a 
case of questioning the spontaneous knowledge initially mobilised to manage the situation; 
on the contrary, this knowledge is revalidated given that it made it possible to differentiate 
limits for the complexity that legitimises lay or professional intervention.  
RCCS Annual Review, 1, September 2009                                                          Changing Self-Medication Practices, Lay Knowledge and Rationales 
 
46 
In other situations, direct empirical learning gives way to learning by example. This is not 
entirely separate from the previous mode – it is, rather, a specialised form of it – but it 
enables us to capture the process of constituting another type of knowledge. Whilst the logic 
of production is the same – since it is through successive personal or shared experiences 
that the knowledge activated in situations considered similar is produced – the difference is 
that the (subjectively mediated) guarantee of the effectiveness of the chosen medicines lies 
in the fact that they have been prescribed by the doctor on previous occasions and have had 
the desired results. As a result, they are no longer used as an attempt at therapy, but as a 
solution. However, the possibility of moving from attempt to solution is not ensured by 
medical validation of medicines alone if this is not combined with the deeper experience of 
recognising symptoms and responses to the chosen treatments.  
Each of the following examples illustrates in detail the progression of these cognitive 
sequences within this mode of learning:  
 
... iŶ situatioŶs ǁe͛ǀe alƌeadǇ ďeeŶ iŶ tǁo oƌ thƌee tiŵes ďefoƌe, theƌe͛s alǁaǇs that 
kŶoǁledge, that eǆpeƌieŶĐe that Ǉou aĐƋuiƌe, isŶ͛t theƌe? Foƌ eǆaŵple, ǁheŶ I get a Đold I 
kŶoǁ fƌoŵ eǆpeƌieŶĐe that if I doŶ͛t take soŵethiŶg, iŶ tǁo oƌ thƌee daǇs͛ tiŵe I͛ll feel a lot 
ǁoƌse, so I take a flu ƌeŵedǇ oƌ soŵethiŶg like that so that it doesŶ͛t get ǁoƌse. I͛ll giǀe Ǉou 
another example: some time ago I had an infection in my finger and I took an anti-
iŶflaŵŵatoƌǇ stƌaight aǁaǇ ďut it didŶ͛t Đuƌe the problem, so I ended up having to go to the 
doctor, but at least it stopped it from getting too bad ... (man, aged 33, college graduate, 
diabetic, interview 1)  
 
 ...a ǁhile ago I said I doŶ͛t self-ŵediĐate, ďut ŵaǇďe that͛s Ŷot ĐoŵpletelǇ tƌue. Foƌ eǆaŵple, I 
know what pain from colitis is and I know I should take Pankreoflat, and if the pain is very bad I 
should also take a Buscopan, otherwise it ǁoŶ͛t go aǁaǇ. That͛s self-ŵediĐatioŶ, ďut it͛s ďǇ 
using medicines prescribed by the doctor and I already know what they are for, I don't do it 
randomly.... (woman, aged 39, 11 years of schooling, with hypertension, interview 25)  
 
If, in analytical terms, the difference between the construction of this kind of knowledge 
and spontaneous knowledge lies in the displacement of learning from the testing method 
(and therefore from the management of uncertainty) to a recognised diagnostic framework 
(and therefore to controlled uncertainty), the respective forms of knowledge that are 
produced must also be distinguishable from each other. On the level of the analytical study 
in question, these cognitive resources assume the shape of confirmed knowledge, which 
provides a more immediate legitimacy when they are activated than that of the previously 
described spontaneous knowledge.  
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Given that the origins of confirmed knowledge are primarily to be found within the 
context of interaction with the medical system, it is usually assumed that this is a matter of 
knowledge resulting from direct assimilation of medical information made available to the 
patient during treatment. However, this information occupies only a residual space, as can 
be seen when the nature of the social process in which it is inscribed is analysed.  
In fact, the claim to a supposed medical didactics which fosters lay modes of assimilating 
expert references – of which the current reconversion of traditional lay reference systems is 
said to be a part – is revealed to be disproportionate to its actual social expression. Rather, it 
is within the context of medical pragmatics, and particularly in its most standardised forms 
of operation, that the conditions emerge for the lay appropriation of medical knowledge.  
In this context, the increasing routinization and standardisation of medical prescriptions 
constitute the main means of lay access to the assimilation and incorporation of expert 
knowledge. It is through this that a learning trajectory emerges in which each medicine or 
set of medicines is associated with the treatment of certain symptoms, due to the fact that 
they are repeatedly prescribed within the context of identical sets of symptoms. This 
learning trajectory cannot be reduced merely to the act of associating medicines with 
symptoms. The effectiveness of the medicine is always reassessed through the filter of 
bodily responses and, as a result, treatment options are adopted or excluded on the 
initiative of the lay population. 
The central role which learning by empirical experience continues to play, even when the 
cognitive references mobilised are assimilated from expert practices, underlies the logic of a 
lay autonomy which prevails in the re-working and readjustment of expert references to the 
foundational matrix of lay knowledge.  
This process of lay appropriation generated by the routinization and standardisation of 
pƌesĐƌiptioŶs also shoǁs that, although it is the doĐtoƌ͛s aĐtioŶ iŶ ǁƌitiŶg out a pƌesĐƌiptioŶ 
that gives rise to the possibility of lay access to expert knowledge, it is the medicine and its 
results that confer lay intelligibility on the medical act. In other words, it is the medicine 
which, in the social process of its lay appropriation, becomes a resource for decoding and 
making expert knowledge intelligible. This is the same as saying that the metonymic effect of 
medicines – which corresponds to representing the medicine as an extension and substitute 
for the doctor, iŶ the seŶse that it is the distillatioŶ of the doĐtoƌ͛s oǁŶ kŶoǁledge, tuƌŶed 
into therapeutic technology (Van der Geest and White, 1989) – may be understood in a 
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broader sense. Medicines do not only represent an extension and replacement of the 
doctor, but are also the means of enabling the lay populace to decode and appropriate 
medical knowledge.9 
The possibilities of cognitive appropriation which prescription medicines represent are 
most evident in the way they are (later) used for the purposes of self-medication. The 
following extracts illustrate the social processing involved in such appropriations: 
 
... ǁheŶeǀeƌ I take ŵediĐiŶe ǁithout goiŶg to the doĐtoƌ it͛s ďeĐause the first time I used it, it 
had been prescribed to me by the doctor. After that, there you are, since I saw that it worked, I 
began using it whenever I think I need it ... (man, aged 30, college graduate, diabetic, interview 
3) 
 
... for years and years I was constantly getting throat infections. When I went to the doctor he 
always prescribed the same medicine, essentially based on antibiotics... A lot of the time I 
didŶ͛t eǀeŶ go to the doctor... why should I?... he͛d oŶlǇ pƌesĐƌiďe soŵethiŶg I alƌeadǇ had at 
home... (woman, aged 45, college graduate, diabetic, interview 47)  
 
... so I pƌefeƌ to take ŵediĐiŶe oŶ the doĐtoƌ͛s ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ. But ǁheŶ it͛s thiŶgs Ǉou͚ǀe 
already had, things you know about, like a sore throat or an inflammation, you know the family 
doĐtoƌ is goiŶg to pƌesĐƌiďe ĐeƌtaiŶ ŵediĐiŶes, doŶ͛t Ǉou?... “o Ǉou just go doǁŶ to the 
Đheŵist͛s aŶd ask theŵ foƌ, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, BƌufeŶ, soŵethiŶg ǁell-known... I think theƌe͛s Ŷo 
Ŷeed to go aŶd ďotheƌ the doĐtoƌ ǁheŶ it͛s just a sŵall thiŶg ... ;ǁoŵaŶ, aged 52, < 9 years of 
schooling, with hypertension, interview 27)  
 
I alǁaǇs keep aŶǇ leftoǀeƌ ŵediĐiŶe aŶd as loŶg as it͛s still ǁithiŶ the sell-by date I use it again 
if I Ŷeed to. I͛ǀe doŶe this a lot ǁith alleƌgies, colds or minor ailments and aches and pains 
ďeĐause I kŶoǁ that if I go to the doĐtoƌ he͛ll pƌesĐƌiďe the saŵe thiŶg oƌ soŵethiŶg siŵilaƌ to 
what I already have at home... (woman, aged 34, college graduate, healthy, interview 43) 
 
What also stands out in these statements is the instrumentality acquired by prescription 
medicines in legitimising not only practices but, at the same time, the cognitive references 
that preside over these practices. In fact, the reiterated affirmation that the medicines used 
had already been prescribed on previous occasions serves, in terms of individual 
                                                 
9 This social use of medicines in the specialisation trajectories of lay knowledge is comparable to that of 
diagnostic technological resources (X-rays, clinical testing, three-dimensional imaging, etc.) and self-diagnosis 
(cholesterol and blood pressure testing, etc.), which are included by Vuckovic and Nichter (1997) as possible 
resources for the lay control of healthcare. It may be added that they also function as decoders of medical 
diagnostics. These resources present diagnostics in the form of images or numerical figures, which make them 
accessible to lay people as they become familiar with their use. Although there may remain a part of medical 
diagnostics which, due to its indeterminate nature, cannot be included in technological codification, this does 
not, at least in less complex situations, invalidate the fact that technological codification may eventually 
reinstate the possibilities of lay control and access to expert knowledge. In this scenario, it is the actual 
centrality of medical mediation in the management of healthcare, supported by the inaccessibility of medical 
knowledge to the lay population, that may be reconfigured as lay appropriation of medical technology expands. 
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subjectivities and their externalisation, as support for the validation of the actual empirical 
experience that determined that they should continue to be used. The expert references 
that have been assimilated thus convert empirical experience into a cognitive resource 
legitimised by the actual underlying expert support.  
This signifies that the routinization of people͛s ĐoŶtaĐts ǁith the ŵediĐal sǇsteŵ has 
not only led to new possibilities for lay access to the incorporation of expert knowledge, but 
has also enabled its use as a tool for constructing new forms of legitimising lay knowledge. In 
some interviews, the search for this legitimation was expressed in particularly explicit ways:  
 
... I͛ǀe alǁaǇs ďeeŶ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed, not only to listen carefully to what the doctor tells me, but also 
to ask ƋuestioŶs, to kŶoǁ ǁhǇ soŵethiŶg has happeŶed, ǁhǇ it is that I͛ŵ takiŶg this Ŷoǁ aŶd 
not that ... I always like to ask, even if it just means being told what I already know... (man, 
aged 29, 12 years of schooling, healthy, interview 36) 
 
Although the legitimation derived from the appropriation of expert knowledge is 
important to individual subjectivities, the boundaries between lay and expert legitimacy 
remain well-defined in terms of the forms of social recognition which circumscribe each one. 
Indeed, the knowledge activated in lay practices, even when it incorporates expert 
references, is never invoked as having the status of knowledge in its universal sense, but 
primarily as practical cognition used in the context of occurrences that are well controlled by 
familiarity. The legitimacy invoked for this cognition is restricted to the framework of lay 
legitimacy, without presupposing any confrontation with expert legitimacy or any claim to 
challenge it. This demarcation of the spheres in which each of these legitimacies is exercised 
therefore identifies the social conditions that make the coexistence of frameworks of lay and 
expert rationales intervening within the same universe compatible.  
The learning by information mode is distinguished from the two previous categories by 
the deliberate act of combining information gathered from different sources – expert 
information disseminated by the mass media, the Internet or specialist magazines – to serve 
as the basis for weighing up the options that may be chosen. However, this form of learning 
also does not have an autonomous space within the construction of lay cognition that can be 
separated from the previous modes of learning centring on the primacy of empirical 
experience. Its effect is essentially to produce mediating knowledge, which does not 
challenge the primacy of experience or the input of spontaneous knowledge or confirmed 
knowledge, but rather reorganises the conditions for validating experience itself.  
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Although this mode was more often detected in the treatment strategies of the better 
educated interviewees, this does not necessarily mean that these social groups have a 
specific cultural predisposition to make use of a particular type of knowledge.10 On the 
contrary, it is the framework of circumstances – and, in particular, the uncertainty involved 
in treatment strategies – that, in general, emerges as the factor favouring investment in 
mediating knowledge. The contingent nature of circumstances becomes evident in several 
narratives, especially in the case of the more educated interviewees:  
 
… Tǁo oƌ thƌee Ǉeaƌs ago I staƌted to haǀe problems with sleep apnea, I was waking myself up 
with my snoring. I began discussing this with some friends who had the same problem, and 
then I started to look for information about it on the Internet. With this information I at least 
knew that the problem could be treated and for this I had to consult a specialist. I had actually 
thought that it was soŵethiŶg that ĐouldŶ͛t ďe tƌeated... ;ŵaŶ, aged ϰϱ, college graduate, with 
hypertension, interview 16)  
 
… Theƌe aƌe those people ǁho go to the doĐtoƌ aŶd just take ǁhateǀeƌ theǇ aƌe pƌesĐƌiďed 
without finding out anything more about it – my in-laws are like that. Whereas my wife and I 
try to find out as much as we can, either on the Internet or by talking to friends, before we 
decide whether to follow a course of treatment, especially if its something new ... (man, aged 
41, college graduate, healthy, interview 35)  
 
The analytical interest in dissociating each of these modes of learning is essentially that of 
revealing the plurality of types of knowledge obscured within the broad category of lay 
knowledge, whilst also conferring visibility on the subtle social processes which determine 
the space assigned to each of the different types of knowledge, or to the levels at which they 
intersect, according to the circumstances of each action. It is at this level that the 
constructed nature of these forms of knowledge becomes clearly visible, given their 
adjustment to the personal and social circumstances of individuals, as well as their indelible 
link to the primacy of bodily experience and shared social experiences.  
As they are constructed and not passively imitated, the different types of lay knowledge 
provide individuals with the possibility of direct control in applying them, and this fosters a 
belief in their safety when mobilised in everyday life. This belief in safety is especially clear in 
                                                 
10 The frequent confusion between (cultural) predispositions and (cultural) resources has fuelled an ideology of 
established cultural profiles, particularly in the field of healthcare, which legitimises differentiated access to 
information. Any cultural predisposition in this or any other area can only be upheld in sociological terms as the 
expression/retranslation of the social conditions in which such predispositions are produced (Bourdieu, 2000, 
1979). Hence, the unveiling of different types of lay knowledge and the ways in which they are activated in 
treatment strategies requires the exclusion of any kind of categorisation according to cultural predispositions, 
since these categorisations obscure the structural conditions and situational dynamics that mobilise different 
types of knowledge. 
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the options for self-medication. In fact, there is a greater likelihood of doubt in relation to 
prescribed medicines used for the first time than in relation to medicines repeatedly used 
for self-medication. Whereas, in the first case, trust in the knowledge of the prescriber is 
activated, in the second case, trust is activated on the basis of knowledge mastered and 
controlled by direct experience.  
It is in this dissymmetry, present not only in the distinctive nature of lay knowledge and 
expert knowledge but, above all, in the way in which the lay relationship to both forms of 
knowledge is structured – i.e. direct lay control incorporated into one and excluded from the 
other – that the conditions for making knowledge of self-medication autonomous are 
generated. It is also in terms of this endogenesis of lay control with regard to knowledge 
activated by the use of medicines that the parallel limited scope of institutional warnings 
aimed at combating the habit of self-medication may be understood.  
Thus, the idea of an absence of rational thinking in self-medication options is offset by a 
framework of reflexiveness continually activated by recourse to different modes of learning. 
It is a reflexiveness that it has become even more imperative to activate in the construction 
of a separate lay perspective (Baszanger, 1998), as sources of information have become 
more contradictory, particularly specialised sources. Hence, within a context of uncertainty 
originating in the current increase in contradictory information, the construction of a 
separate lay perspective takes on the status of a social antidote that preserves the unity and 
integrity of cognitive referencing, functioning as a stronghold of ontological safety in the 
everyday management of healthcare.  
It is by connecting this plurality of analytical focuses that self-medication is indisputably 
revealed as one of the spheres with the greatest visibility in the recomposition and 
specialisation of lay knowledge on healthcare. Indeed, the gradual social disqualification of 
traditional domestic therapeutic knowledge has given way to the gradual appropriation of 
new cognitive resources made available by the increasing pharmacologisation of everyday 
life. This means that the logic and rationales of self-medication are not only distinctive in 
terms of the constructed nature of the knowledge they are based on, but also in terms of the 
expertisation trajectories which the sphere of self-medication favours.  




The trajectories for the reconversion and expertisation of lay cognitive resources analysed 
above reposition the knowledge activated by self-medication practices within the framework 
of a lay rationale that cannot be reduced to the mere imitation of the pragmatics embodied 
in professional rationales. However, neither is it dissociated from, nor impermeable to, these 
spheres. Hence, this approach supports the idea that the plurality of the cognitive resources 
mobilised and activated within trajectories of reconversion and expertisation of lay 
knowledge on healthcare cannot be confined to the status of mere beliefs that has been 
ascribed to them, and far less should it continue to be seen as lacking legitimacy.  
As other authors have argued (Popay and Williams, 1996), the attribution of the status of 
knowledge to lay cognition within the sphere of healthcare is not only based on its actual 
cognitive nature and effective social use, but also constitutes an imperative for 
reconceptualising the modes of intervention and professional repositioning regarding lay 
universes.  
However, this imperative needs to be expanded. It cannot be restricted to recognition of 
the cognitive nature of lay knowledge, but also requires recognition of its plural and 
contingent nature. It is knowledge that is neither homogenous nor universalisable, precisely 
because this knowledge is constructed within the frameworks of personal contingency and 
socio-cultural diversity.  
In the research study that served as a basis for this article, this diversity was found in the 
multiple combinations which, according to the contingencies of each situation and the 
resources of each individual, regroup the mosaic of spontaneous knowledge, confirmed 
knowledge and mediating knowledge activated by lay therapeutic initiatives.  
The study also demonstrated that the cognitive constructions involved are based on a 
dual affiliation: they are not only derived from the reflexive appropriation of expert 
references, but also from the repeated reassessment of the efficacy of these references 
within the framework of practical experiences.  
It is precisely the fact that they are constructed, rather than passively absorbed, that 
affirms the new forms of lay autonomy in relation to expert hegemony. In this sense, we 
may refer to newly emerging rationales, which cannot be understood outside the framework 
of the increasing interdependence of lay and expert universes. One of the challenges which 
sociology faces today is that of providing a more epistemological and dialectical 
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interpretation of the actual effects of modern reflexivity, an interpretation that can account 
for these new interdependences.  
Translated by Sheena Caldwell 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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